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ON THE UNIQUENESS OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH*
ABSTRACT. The significance of the behavior of biological entities cannot be fully
explained in terms of the physical and chemical processes upon which contem-
porary biological and medical research depends. The characteristic proper of
biological entities is that they are systems marked by 'inwardness', that is, a
capacity to interpret meanings in order to reach goals. The significance of this
characteristic is given in examples from the author's morphological research.
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Modern biological research is so diverse, with so many different
goals and methods that it compels close examination. Much of the
development of biological research and of insight into the general
significance of the various ways of conducting research depends
on a deeper understanding of this diversity.
The work of the geneticist engaged in research on the hereditary
properties of the cell-nucleus is different from that of the
neurologist who investigates the structures of the central nervous
system. The physiologist who tries to track down a definite
enzyme effect in a gland has a different goal from that of an
ethologist who investigates the social behavior of a school of fish
or the relation of blossoms to pollinating insects. A considerable
distance exists between the work of a paleontologist and that of an
embryologist who experiments on a Triton embryo. How long did
it take until the biological research of J. von Uexkuell achieved
recognition as a scientific method? So different are these methods
that at times people have tried to separate obsolete old methods
from modern ones, or to differentiate exact methods from merely
descriptively ones. Nevertheless, the study of life is a task that one
will certainly conceive in a unitary fashion. Furthermore, the
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interaction with colleagues is necessary for every researcher; the
isolation of specific research work is dangerous. Both the study of
chromosomes and neurology encounter similar basic questions of
localization and come upon the same borderline situations of
understanding. The psychologist, like the ethologist, experiences
again and again the necessity of looking for the reference system
that can give meaning to his own results. Ultimately, the paleon-
tologist, the embryologst, and the geneticist all work on the same
basic problem of the homology of components in a common plan.
How can one survey this complexity? Into what greater
coherence can the results of these different modes of work be
meaningfully organized? This is the question the following
analysis attempts to answer.
Our attempt is determined by a basic concept of the organism, a
cardinal point of which shall be emphasized immediately. We
want to stress a fact which is completely disregarded by many,
and which has been moved as far as possible to a peripheral
position by others who view it as an inconvenience: We refer to
the fact that organisms, as relatively autonomous active systems,
possess the quality of "inwardness", and that the intensity of this
"inwardness", especially in animals, increases with the increasing
level of organization. We mean by this term "inwardness" that
characteristic of life which we know from our conscious
experience most intensely, and which can be measured not by the
dimensions of space, but by those dimensions that are
"mechanisms for the articulation of meaning" (Bedeutungseinrich-
tungen), and that in human beings are represented aUegorically by
language. Biological research that studies inwardness has often
been neglected on the ground that it opens the door to
anthropomorphism, because we are most familiar with inward-
ness in ourselves.
The inclination to interpret the phenomena of life on the basis of
the experience of human feelings has been resisted for some time,
because it allegedly endangers research. This understandable
resistance has, however, pushed a central fact of life to the
periphery of observation, namely, the fact of inwardness, that
living beings are autonomously acting beings.
Indeed, given the restrictions of research to structure, develop-
ment, metabolism, and reproduction, study was concentrated
upon more easily comprehensible phenomena of life, and
knowledge was thereby enlarged tremendously. This increase in
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knowledge, however, has been at the price of a corresponding
impoverishment of our conception of life. It has been sacrificed to
a false notion of objectivity, which arose when one removed from
the "object" of research on life the particularly important quality
of "subjectivity", and thought that life would become thereby
more scientifically comprehensible and could be explored more
exactly. All that one achieved, however, is a deceptive approxima-
tion to the characteristics of physical research objects, because one
had completely failed to observe that this approximation could
not be understood as the self-evident goal of all biological
research, and because of the generally unnoticed fact that one has
ignored inwardness.
For some time, however, a change has been taking place, an
awareness about the specificity of biological research. As a conse-
quence, the central significance of inwardness has also been
recognized again. If we acknowledge the importance that is
attributed today to behavioral research and to ethology, we are
clearly confronted by a new orientation. However, we should also
note that this change manifests itself in that field of research that
once was programmatically named "developmental mechanics",
both in the modification of the name to "developmental
physiology", and in the changing perception of the leading
researchers as they focus on their object of research. To cite Hans
Spemann:
However, I think I still owe the reader an explanation. Again and again, expres-
sions were used that denote not physical but physiological analogies. That this
has happened is meant to be more than a poetic picture. What is meant is this:
the topical reaction of the segment of a zygote, endowed with the most different
potencies in an embryonic "field", its behavior in a distinctive "context", are not
the usual, simple or complicated chemical reactions. Rather, these developmental
processes ... in their coherence have no greater similarity with anything we
know than with those vital processes that we know most intimately, the
psychological. Aside from just the philosophical consequences, in the interest of
progress of concrete exact knowledge we should not abandon the advantage of
our position between the two worlds, i.e., the mechanical and the subjective.
With my experiments I took , I believe, a step forward on the road to this lofty
goal (Spemann, 1936).
The significance of this change is, to be sure, by no means fully
recognized, and I consider it an urgent task to emphasize it and to
facilitate its breakthrough. We should put at the center of research
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into living organisms the peculiarity that they are always centers
of activity, that organisms relate actively to their environment,
and that this centrality presents that specific mode of being that
we know maximally from our own experience and to which we
give the general term "inwardness".
As just said, we know this "inwardness" best from ourselves. A
statement about the specificity of being alive becomes ever more
inadequate and more difficult as the ontological distance separat-
ing living beings in general from human beings becomes greater.
Today we have gradually come to realize that we are not justified
in restricting our attention to virus material or a bacterium, i.e.,
the one-cell organism, because the results of research into these
forms of life are too elementary character to give us the
phenomena of life, in general in an easily accessible form.
Our biological resarch, based on the totality of our perceptions
and experiences, shows that inwardness discloses itself in all of
the organism's manifestations, that there are levels of intensity of
inwardness, and that these levels can be recognized by us in the
characteristics of their manifestation. This view demands special
caution on two counts: on the one hand, we have have to examine
carefully what in way the wealth of our own inwardness also
belongs to other levels of life; on the other hand, the poverty of
manifestations of inwardness in that counterpart of us that we call
the "lower" forms of life must not entice us too easily into a
transition to the inanimate world, where the uniqueness of life
shows itself even less clearly.
As always, change of form caused by growth and metabolism,
development, reproduction, and regulation will be important
criteria for testing life's processes. But the study of these manifesta-
tions must be embedded within a broader concept of the or-
ganism. This broader concept widens the perspective to multi-
faceted research of living beings as centers of inwardness. We
have drawn above at least some outlines of the concept of the
organism with which the intentions of the research biologist are
concerned. Now let us elicit the particular methods of research.
In what way do the questions of biologists refer to the reality of
the object that they are required to investigate in its wholeness,
the sum of the structures in and through which it lives? In trying
to give an answer we shall see that the questions of biological
research are more diverse than we usually think. The relative
clarity of widely used scientific research methods, viz., experimen-
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tation and comparison, has frequently supported and promoted
the error that a similar agreement exists in the kinds of questions.
Let me try to point out more precisely the actual contrasts that are
an essential premise for an overall view of the wide field of
biology. I shall try to achieve this through a metaphor which is
meant to make clear our various attitudes toward living processes.
A metaphor can help us only if it originates from a field which is
more comprehensible than the field that we want to illuminate -
in addition, the metaphor must encompass the entire complex
which engages our attention, that is to say, not only the living
object we want to comprehend, but also the biologists who strive
to comprehend it.
Our metaphor is the performance of a play. This metaphor is
complicated and dynamic; it is valid for many different kinds of
performances; it thus can reproduce a wealth of ways of life even
in a limited form. Its most significant use, however, it provides
through its twofold aspect: the complementarity of the activity
behind the stage and the activity on the stage, which creates the
two different situations in terms of which a research worker can
formulate his questions. This metaphor of the performance of a
play shall be a means to see more clearly the struggle for an
adequate view of what we mean by life. Such an attempt owes
much to similar previous experiments which through the stage
metaphor try to elucidate some feature of life. The metaphor has a
long and rich history that cannot be described here. In this presen-
tation, however, it has a particular meaning which is different
from the goal of biologists who likewise employ the metaphor of
the theater of life.
The observer behind the stage sees an unfolding of forces in a
workshop which is absolutely necessary for the success of the
performance. Here we observe the factors which regulate the
sequence of the scenes, guide the single actor, and change the
scenery. We see how the machines work that produce the sound
of the rain, the thunder, and the lightning, and we recognize many
of the activities that determine the details and the whole of the
play. As an observer of these happenings behind the stage I can
make this "look behind the scenes" the exclusive center of my
interest. I can focus intensely on acquiring the knowledge that is
necessary for such work. I may also study the historical develop-
ment of the behind-the-scene technicalities and present them so
vividly and arrestingly that they seem to be the most important
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part, the solely important element of the performance.
If, on the other hand, I remain in front of the curtain, then I
know the activities going on behind the stage, but I also know that
I can fully comprehend the play only by completely ignoring these
activities. Only by completely forgetting them will I be fully
captivated by the play.
Standing in front of the stage, I can participate in the play. I can
be moved by it, or I can view it cognitively, analyze it scientifi-
cally. But even in the latter case I must maintain the standpoint of
the observer in front of the stage if I really want to do justice to the
play's content, if I want to explore it in detail.
Still another situation may be considered: We are in an entirely
strange country with different customs and with a language we
cannot understand. There too they perform plays. We go into the
auditorium and see and hear the foreign play. Some parts we
understand, others we do not, and yet our attempt to understand
the play, as well as our abandonment of understanding, are
always made in the certitude that a meaningful play is performed.
It is time to return to our task of exploring the phenomena of
life and of testing the comparative value of our metaphor. We
want, however, to apply the metaphor cautiously, and to expect
from it nothing more than a heuristic clarification.
Perhaps it is good to remind ourselves that our metaphor
contains a simplification. We speak of two aspects: on and behind
the stage. Reality provides still other standpoints. The poet, for
instance, stands in relation to the performance in a superior place,
one which includes both aspects. In a different way the same
holds true for the director. It is not difficult, we think, to see why
in the scientific investigation of life we usually restrict ourselves to
the double aspect: on and behind the stage.
The accent, in other words, lies always on emphasizing the dual
character of the entire situation of a play's performance. The
emphasis is thereby on the necessity of at least a twofold way of
thinking and a twofold type of research. We may see the play
naively, or explore it scientifically: the twofold aspect is always
present. The observer will always be able to evaluate what he sees
in a broader context if he is very clear about the distinctive feature
of his own standpoint.
The situation of biological research confronted with its object -
life - presents the same twofold aspect. It also necessitates
viewing and exploring biology from at least two standpoints.
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With the awareness of the twofold aspect, many disputes concern-
ing problems of rank and of differences of the "scientific charac-
ter^ ' of various biological research methods become unnecessary.
Only the sum of the several possible research approaches can
provide a scientific description of a biological research object at
any given time.
Today research that corresponds to the "back stage" occupies
the most space, one may say, and represents the prevailing efforts.
Therefore, when I introduced our metaphor, I spoke first of what
happens behind the stage. It is a matter of describing the or-
ganisms, dissecting them, and examining their parts in terms of
their material and functional characteristics. The greater propor-
tion of morphological, physiological, ontogenetic research, and
genetics is occupied with this task. These modes of research take
priority for practical research, because the practice of biological
technology must rely especially (though not exclusively) on this
type of research. He who wants to intervene with the processes of
nature must control them, whether or not the final goal of his
intervention is positive welfare or destructive. Thus, the grand
symbiosis of medicine and biology prefers primarily this
standpoint; the powerful biological technology that emerged from
research in pharmacological chemistry needed first of all to
promote this type of research. This type of work, this invasion into
the world behind the stage of living processes does not need a
detailed explanation in order to emphasize and justify its
importance; for it is just this mode of biology which dominates the
field today, and which will always be a frequent variant, quantita-
tively probably the decisive variant, of biological research. The
biologist must not be astonished that this mode of research that
goes behind the stage needs to be preferred wherever control
plays a role; but in judging scientific modes of research, this point
must never be forgotten. However, it is precisely the undisputed
significance of this type of research that has led to a grave one-
sidedness: to the attitude that this mode of biological research is
biology proper, biology as such. Consequently, a concept of the
organism was developed that was not only too narrow - this
insight has been noticed frequently - but also, because of its
standpoint, completely one-sided in its conception of the living
being. The fight against this narrowness and one-sidedness was
futile, because one did not realize that the problem is ultimately
one of the human standpoint, an anthropological problem. One
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did not see that the results obtained from this standpoint could be
entirely "correct"; but that from quite another perspective, the
results could be entirely irrelevant, and in all their "correctness"
entirely insignificant.
Thus a model emerged that the organism was merely a "carrier"
of functions, the notion that the activities of metabolism, of
regulation, and of reproduction existed merely for their own sake
and had simply subsumed the "carrier" that made possible the
execution of these activities. Phenomena that could not find a
direct explanation through such an analysis were explained as
being indirectly related to these functions through some internal
dependence.
The attitude toward animal hide patterns illustrates this orienta-
tion. To "explain" a pattern, as for instance, the striping of a zebra,
one tried to account for the pattern as a necessary sequence of
certain rhythmically spread states in the embryonic skin. These
skin-states were attributed to lawful causes and necessities. The
final pattern was an unimportant and senseless sequela. Charac-
teristics which we explain morphologically were, as the botanist
Goebel once held, those features of an organism that could not yet
be explained physiologically.
I must leave it to those more qualified to test to what extent a
variant of the common idea may have participated in this peculiar
misinformation of the living Gestalten: that the essence of a thing
should always be sought as something concealed in its interior, in
other words, as hidden in it. The appearance is thus reduced to
something of a "fraud"; the interior is the essential. The micro-
scopic is more essential than the macroscopic; the atomic more
essential than the microscopic. This kind of thinking should some
day be recognized by biologists as dangerous for biological
research, if they are to avoid in the future some gross misin-
terpretations. The elevation of the physico-chemical sciences to the
natural sciences par excellence is also partly responsible for the
interpretation of the living organism just mentioned. Due to the
well-founded high esteem of the physical-chemical methods, one
completely overlooks the fact that this type of research does not in
dealing with its object in any way recognize the dual aspect of the
two standpoints. It achieves the desired analysis of its subject
matter by approaching it from only a single standpoint.
The image on which we base our attempt to comprehend the
phenomenon of organisms can simultaneously show us a solution
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to several misunderstandings. It will also demonstrate the com-
plete inadequacy of the above-outlined interpretation of an
organism as merely that of a carrier of functions of survival. For,
by being aware in our research of our standpont behind the stage,
we are immediately forced in principle to require simultaneously
research on the stage, and thus we assign the same type of scien-
tific tools to both of these modes of research. Our comparison
immediately reveals that by observing from the front of the stage,
we experience a totally different aspect of the phenomenon of
living than previously experienced when we observed the aspect
behind the stage.
The dual aspect, the decisive point in our metaphor, reveals
itself at each examination of a living process, whether I choose a
narrower or larger part to examine.
Turning to the metabolic functions in plants or animals, it is
dear that the analysis of substances may be done by the methods
of the chemist, and that of organs by the methods of the mor-
phologist. A more profound examination will succeed in locating
special tools as, for instance, the formation and effect of ferments.
But all these metabolic properties only lead to a truly biological
understanding when I relate the results of this examination
behind the stage to a play that is actually performed - in this case
it is called "maintenance of the organism", or "development", or
something similar.
In the physiological examination of organ functions, the whole
of which such functions are a part is usually so striking and visible
that, in general, one has always recognized the role of such
functions in a play. The situation is quite different if one moves
beyond the area of the elementary maintenance functions, and if
the point is to recognize the more individual modes of functions
and of interrelationships in the appearance of the organism. Here
the play that is performed is not immediately self-evident. It must
first be understood as such; only this insight, often not easily
obtained, leads to an association of previously not-understood
properties of organisms with more than individual interrelation-
ships.
As an example, consider a red, wild carnation which blossoms
on the stony ground on a sunny slope. The scientist who examines
this red carnation, finds, let us say, a pigment of the glycoid
group, an anthozian. He is also able to discover the conditions
under which such a red hue appears in the interstitial spaces of
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the petals; likewise with respect to its connection with sugar
metabolism, assimilation, the influence of light, warm tempera-
ture, etc. He can also examine in much detail the basic plan of the
point of vegetation and thus elucidate for us the formation of such
a blossom. Intense morphogenetic, biochemical studies will
perhaps one day lead to an extensive knowledge of the hereditary
factors which help to form the blossoms, and to a comprehensive
scientific presentation which will offer the impression of an
exhaustive completeness, especially if we focus exclusively upon
the isolated blossom merely as a part of the plant.
But what happens if I discover the interplay of the blossom with
a butterfly and begin to consider that aspect? Then I soon find a
new wealth of facts about the blossom as well as about the struc-
ture of the butterfly, all of which can only be understood in a
context that is not at all grasped by the previously discussed
investigation of the plant. Note that this new mode of examination
is not just an expansion of the scientific picture that has already
been supplied. Rather, it means taking an entirely new standpoint.
Let us first of all notice that from this new standpoint all
previously experienced facts remain as they were, and are true;
however, they are no no longer of focal importance. It is, for
instance, entirely irrelevant what chemical substance constitutes
the red of the carnation, and when in its metabolism this blossom
appears. Relevant now is the fact that the blossom is red, and that
this red - the emergence of which is unimportant - acts to provide
a particular stimulus to the eye of a higher animal structure, e.g.,
an insect. The same fact - the red blossom - appears as an element
of a meaningful connection in another system, quite different from
the previously described one: a system in which perception plays
a role, be it the perception of a seeing organism in relation to
another seeing organism, or the perception of a seeing organism
(insect) in relation to a non-seeing one, as in the case of the red
blossom.
For the moment, the chemical nature of the red substance is
unimportant. What is important is the fact that a luminosity
against a background appears as a figure, a Gestalt. This red
thereby acquires a certain kind of kinship with the red of other
flowers, though perhaps chemically entirely different, e.g., the red
poppy, the red of fruits, the peculiar lipochrome-red of the pharyn-
geal color of open-mouthed songbirds, even the red of flags and
traffic signals. It is specific for all these figures that they affect, in a
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wide system, a living eye as a Gestalt against a background; that in
their shape and localization several essential characteristics can be
demonstrated, all structured and coordinated to emphasize a
precise outline, a distinct contrast of a figure against a back-
ground, and clear visibility of their positions.
The relative ease with which such Gestalten are recognized in
social life contains a danger that these wholes may be viewed as
manifesting only "the significance" of the structures, and that
ultimately the appearance of the organism is again construed as a
collection of stimuli. While in the past the external form was
judged to be a more or less irrelevant "envelope" hiding the
"essential" structures (e.g., the internal organs), today the danger
is that it will be viewed as merely a collection of signals, as, a mere
carrier, so to speak, of traffic signs. Such an interpretation has
been willingly acknowledged by research workers, the more so
since such "roles" are easily understood as useful functions and
thereby comprehensible to everyday thought.
However, if we seriously contemplate the idea of the twofold
modes of research on living processes, we shall have to entertain
the possibility that here, too, many "plays" that we watch are
performed without our full comprehension. Indeed, we should
accept this assumption as much more probable than its opposite,
namely, that we had completely understood the living organism
in its significance. Thus, along with our intuition about the
meaning of unintelligible plays, our notion of the horizon of
understanding also goes beyond the more familiar notibn of
utilitarian plays and roles. We strive to leam the languages in
which the not-understood plays are written and performed.
However, with this view of an organism as a not-understood
"play", have we not crossed that borderline where a scientific
investigation ends and speculation begins? We are of a different
opinion: research into the meaning, and scientific inquiry into the
"roles", of Gestalten is possible insofar as a distinct scientific
reference system can be constructed in which meaning plays a
major role. Keeping with our metaphor: as long as I see the
possibility of learning the foreign language of and gestures in the
play, the possibility remains of one day understanding the unintel-
ligible play I have seen.
To determine as much as possible the scientific reference
systems in which the external appearance of an organism has
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meaning and significance is a new task, but in an old field of
research: morphology. Decoding the language of living Gestalten
has hitherto been attempted in very diverse, but only incipient,
stages of morphological research. Even if the research behind the
stage allows us, because of its powerful practical results, to forget
that the processes stand in the service of an actual play, the insight
into the necessity for more profound Gestalt research leads again
and again to attempts to learn the languages of the external
appearances of living organisms.
May I point out a few insights that in recent times have become
more dear through morphological research?
The determination of the degree of cerebralization (Portmann,
1948) through intracerebral indices allows for the first time
determination of the relative mass of higher centers in relation to
the mass of the elementary parts of the cerebrum. Criteria thereby
result which allow an arrangement of the brain centers in groups
that are undoubtedly morphologically related. Applied
cautiously, this arrangement can serve as a reference system in
which the external appearances can be arranged to correspond
with the characteristics of other senses, such as scents or tone
Gestalten. I have arranged such characteristics in vertebrates, and
have called attention to the regular relations which exist between
rank and appearance. It is apparent that the lower forms carry
patterns in which the location of conspicious markings appears to
be quite arbitrary, while in warm-blooded animals the head or the
reproductive pole, and often both together, is the carrier of formal
accents. It is also apparent that in ruminants, in other words in a
group of closer kinship, a separation of the external sexual charac-
teristics takes place with increasing cerebralization. The
prominent eyeteeth disappear and the components of the
forehead dominate. The disputed phenomenon of the descensus
of the gonads in male mammals, the descensus of the testicles,
acquires in the ranked reference system a meaningful interpreta-
tion: it becomes another part of the ornamental characteristics of
the anal pole. The proof of the connection of non-utilitarian
phenomena with facts of organizational rank provides us with the
first hint of a meaning of Gestalt characteristics of organisms that
does not remain within the reference system of the elementary
survival function of an individual, but plays its role in a totally
different reference system, namely, in that of organizational rank.
I have characterized the particular significance of the characteris-
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tics of external appearances which can be shown to be related to
organizational rank as the "display value of the phenomenon"
(Portmann, 1948). The characteristics of Gestalt posses this specific
display value beyond all purely survival functions. F.J.J. Buyten-
dijk (1928) pointed to the same aspect of the phenomena of living
beings when he spoke of the "demonstrative value of being" of
living forms (Buytendijk, 1928). Similar facts are emphatically
underscored by H. Peters (1928), who separates a superposed
"whole of form" from a functional whole (Peters, 1948). The
attempt of R. Woltereck (1940) also must be mentioned in this
connection; he speaks of an expression of ideas of organic form
free of purpose and calls them "aristie of formation" (ibid.). I
mention these endeavors, because they originated with ex-
perienced biologists who have experimentally investigated vast
areas of animal life, and because their conclusions serve as impor-
tant hints of a richer concept of organism.
Display value also belongs to organs that are associated with
elementary functions of survival, especially organs for social
information and the expression of mood. Their display value can
be demonstrated. Such organs reveal forms that exceed the
optimal functional value of the elementary survival function. If
the mere presence of an organ can be associated with an elemen-
tary task, still some feature of its specific being becomes meaning-
ful only when one considers its diplay function. The reference
system that is given through the determination of organizational
rank allows one to identify some phenomena as belonging to a
more encompassing living order, and elucidates properties that
elude the usual functional interpretation, which is viewed only
one-sidedly in such relation. One example suffices: the external
ear of mammals is primarily an organ of the auditory system. It
remains in this role before anything else, for all simple, rat-like
'lower" mammals; in others, it serves for temperature regulation.
But with higher cerebralization, the external ear also plays the role
of an organ for social information: the various positions of exter-
nal ears function as signs of changes of mood in beasts of prey and
hoofed animals.
However, beyond these roles these structures, through enlarge-
ment, hairiness, coloration, and position may be associated with
principles the particularity of which do not belong to any of the
mentioned functions. In these specific articulations of form, the
level and the uniqueness of the animal species in question
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manifests itself with unmistakable precision. We call this fact the
"display value" of an external part of the organism.
The examination of the display value leads via the structures
providing survival value - whose considerable development in
external appearance has already been emphasized - to external
appearances that belong to an order which transcends every
survival function. It is possible to establish this reference with
scientific rigor, even if the precision of measurement cannot
readily be achieved. This possibility of scientific rigor opens an
ultimate horizon of understanding within the framework of
scientific biological research. By demonstrating the connection
between rank and display value, it calls attention to the very
essential biological phenomenon of inwardness. It does so by
focusing on an aspect from which disclosure of inwardness was
least expected: (external) appearance.
Our attempt to indicate the standpoint of biological research
does not aim to generate a new biological taxonomy. Rather, our
aim is to view in as encompassing a way as possible the particular
beings which organisms are. Then everything that can be dis-
closed scientifically can find its proper place in a suitably far and
broad horizon. Our picture of social life serves this broad view.
Living processes reveal their dual aspect, however, in every
instance. On the one hand, the dual aspect requires the investiga-
tion of service structures and functions, and on the other, it
demands at the same time that we understand the superposed
whole that uses these structures and functions.
The two possibilities of investigation each require a specific
method. Investigating the serving structures, we are able to use to
a great extent the methods of the physicist and chemist. Nobody
will fail to recognize the relationship of physics to biophysics, or
of chemistry to biochemistry; but in using these methods we still
must pay careful attention to the specific characteristic of the
phenomenon of the living. The comprehension of the superposed
realities which utilize the structures and functions discovered by
these methods demands quite different and specific methods in
order to answer the questions posed here.
In our survey the accent was placed very intentionally on the
second standpoint, the aspect which concerns the front of the
stage, the exploration of that living reality which utilizes the
backstage physico-chemical effects. I find this front-stage em-
phasis urgent, because it is hardly necessary today to emphasize
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the powerful backstage research methods to which biotechnology
owes its great potential.
Our emphasis of the dual aspect of biological work is intended
to counter an impoverished, one-sided comprehension of the
phenomenon of life, and thus to provide a richer, broader one. We
are principally interested in exploring the intuitive idea that the
external appearance of organisms has a significance that
transcends by far its mere survival function, and about which we
can learn something significant through biological research. A great
number of our contemporaries must first be made to understand
that it is not the function of living organisms to be merely compli-
cated metabolic apparatuses, but that metabolic organization is
the manifestation of something more important: namely, the
enigmatic reality before us, whose meaning we try to understand
as much as we possibly can, which is the essence of biological
research.
The scientific attempt to uncover the meaningfulness of the
external appearances of living beings presupposes a model of the
boundaries of the human understanding that allows for scientific
assertions about the external appearance of living beings may
possibly play. That which may be said scientifically about the
organism at any given time can only be found in such a broad
horizon of understanding. But if a reference system appears in
which the meaning of a living Gestalt can be recognized, then
science must place this meaning in question and investigate it
with the appropriate means.
The concern to discover a scientific reference system is the most
important task of biological research that has as its goal an all-
encompassing view of what we generally call being alive. The
subject matter of biological research that becomes visible by
emphasizing the display value of organic Gestalten becomes
legitimate as a scientific field of inquiry by arranging the facts to
be tested according to a hierarchically reference system. This
sytem must be made as precise as possible by determining de-
grees of cerebralization through metrical means. Nobody now
knows how far biological research of this type will extend the
horizon for fully understanding living Gestalten, but provided that
what actually can be said at a given time will be said, the old
saying also holds for biological research: One should think big
about the object of one's research.
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